



Corruption among sport officials in early Israeli football

Udi Carmi & Moshe Levy

To cite this article: Udi Carmi & Moshe Levy (2020): Corruption among sport officials in early Israeli football, Israel Affairs, DOI: [10.1080/13537121.2020.1775952](https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2020.1775952)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2020.1775952>



Published online: 11 Jun 2020.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 8



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



Corruption among sport officials in early Israeli football

Udi Carmi^a and Moshe Levy^b



^aPhysical Education School, Ohalo College, Katzrin, Israel; ^bDepartment of Sociology and Anthropology, Ariel University, Ariel, Israel

ABSTRACT

This article explores the roots of football corruption in Israel in the first decades after independence. A socio-historical analysis of documents, correspondence, and newspaper items reveals the key role played by sports officials in corruption in the football industry. More broadly, the article shows that the historical context and a political model of commitment to political centres in which sports in Israel in general and Israeli football in particular operated constituted fertile ground for unorthodox conduct and practices that undermined the integrity of football matches. These findings challenge various theories that argue that corruption in sports has universal features that are independent of specific historical, social, cultural circumstances.

KEYWORDS Corruption; sports; football; Israel

The year 2020 marks the 49th anniversary of the publication of the Etzioni Commission report, also known by its full name as *The Commission of Inquiry into the Rumours Concerning Money Payoffs to Influence the Results of the National Football League Games*. At the time of its publication, the report, which exposed severe corruption among football players and even worse, among sport officials, caused a media stir and shocked the Israeli public. Then, as now, sport officials whose primary function is to provide service, were perceived by sport activists as the weakest link in the Israeli sport.¹ Today, the term ‘*Askan*’ (official) in Hebrew continues to reflect a popular, somewhat derogatory attitude as opposed to more respectful and authoritative meaning of the English word *official*, which is defined as ‘a person in a position of authority’.² The definition of the Israeli official as a representative of the public and as one who serves the purposes of the society did not always correspond to reality. Often the official’s personal interest took precedence over public interest. Many officials began their careers representing small but influential groups and eventually became

CONTACT Udi Carmi  udic@ohalo.ac.il  Ohalo College, Physical Education School, Katzrin, Israel 1290017, Israel

© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

representatives of political parties in political institutions, primarily labour organisations.³ Some of them considered sport a springboard for key positions and a pathway to influential political career. This article focuses on both sport officials who participated in corruption with the intent to gain profit and officials who were negligent in preventing it.

Corruption in football

Corruption in global football, whether on- or off-field, is considered by researchers, sports officials, the media, and sports fans a major threat to football today.⁴ This perspective gained traction especially after the exposure of corruption scandals in FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) in the past decade, which led to convictions of senior football officials on charges of bribery and corruption. In response to this threat, various agencies and organisations have proposed diverse action plans based on the sociological, economics, criminological, and legal insights gained in the field of sports science research.

The theories developed to explain corruption in sports in general, and specifically in football, can be divided into theories based on individual-level explanations and theories based on structural macro-level explanations.⁵ Theories in the first group use rational choice models and typically examine the motivations of athletes and referees involved in corruption.⁶ The findings of these studies propose variables such as potential career promotions, financial temptations, intimidation by criminal elements, economic exploitation of athletes, and athletes' typically competitive nature as factors that potentially motivate involvement in corruption in sports.⁷

Theories of the second type seek to identify social, political, and economic factors that promote corruption in football. According to these theories, the two key structural factors leading to corruption in football leagues are illegal gambling and the growing commercialisation of football. Illegal betting and gambling is a huge global industry, especially in the Far East, which is valued at enormous sums and uses online technologies to affect the outcomes of games on a large scale.⁸ Privatisation and commercialisation of football are also described as major factors that promote corruption.⁹ These developments, which have accelerated in the final third of the previous century, have transformed football into a global business that generates enormous revenues for a large number of stakeholders including heads of state, team owners, shareholders, agents, broadcast networks, and manufacturers of sports-related products. These interested parties will often bend the rules and undermine the integrity and spirit of the sport in order to increase their profits or reduce the risks of their investments in the sport.

The desire to identify universal factors that account for the rising level of global corruption in football is not surprising in view of the need for

enforcement and other agencies to develop an action plan to combat the phenomenon. Due to their desire to present generalisations, however, theories of the types noted above, whether targeting micro-level or macro-level factors, tend to disregard the historical and cultural contexts of corruption in football in specific locations and periods. Several researchers have even argued that contexts such as these are irrelevant for our understanding and explication of the phenomenon. For example, Hill states that ‘widespread match corruption is not a cultural phenomenon’.¹⁰

This article uses a socio-historical analysis to challenge such arguments. It posits that the specific historical, social, and cultural context plays a meaningful role in affecting malfeasance in football, hence seeks to explore corruption as a sociological rather than social issue. An analysis of this type, which aims to understand corruption in football, rather than proposes a general treatment for it, allows to understand the ideographic significance of the phenomenon. The current analysis focuses on Israeli football in a period prior to the commercialisation or privatisation of the sport. As a result, developments that have been described as significant factors for corruption are irrelevant in our test case. The history of Israeli football has been significantly affected by the short history of the State of Israel and to address corruption in football we firsts describe corruption in Israel and the historical context in which corruption infiltrated the sport of football in Israel.

Corruption in Israel

The roots of corruption in Israel can be traced to the pre-independence period. Even under Ottoman rule, then during the British Mandate for Palestine (1920–48), practices were established to help the country’s Jewish inhabitants gain privileges by circumventing the law and colonial bureaucratic structures. These practices included *bakshish* payments (bribery payments made to Ottoman officials) and ‘protection fees’ (using informal social networks to obtain favours and benefits). However, while these practices were frequently justified as patriotic means necessary to achieve the national goals of the Zionism Movement, the most significant practice that took root in the young state of Israel served much narrower political interests. This type of corruption, known as clientelism, was an outgrowth of the political structure of Israeli society prior to and after independence. This structure divided society into two main (non-exhaustive) sectors: the ruling labour party and the rival liberal sector. Each sector established a web of political parties, organisations, media, cultural and health institutions, and other agencies. The many immigrants arriving on Israel’s shores in the first years of statehood developed dependence on these structures, especially the setup of the hegemonic labour movement. These dependencies produced

patronage relations that were fertile ground for corruption in many areas of life ranging from provision of public services made conditional on voting for the ruling party, through promotions in the military and in civil service awarded to people in the inner circle, to assignment of jobs conditional on the applicant presenting confirmation of his affiliation with the 'correct' camp (*tzetaleh* – 'a note' in Yiddish).

In the period discussed in this article, from Israel's independence to the 1970s, football was enmeshed in the above political model described. The country's two major political parties – Mapai (the workers' party) and Hazionim Haklaliyim (the Liberal Party) – controlled Hapoel and Maccabi sports associations, respectively. In this period, before Israeli football underwent privatisation and commodification, these political sports associations had a critical impact on the management of football.¹¹ This article explores the implications of the socioeconomic context on corruption in football in Israel, which threatened to destroy the sport completely. The analysis focuses on the institutionalised corruption that was an outgrowth of sports officials' orders and actions, and which affected football players on and off the field and endangered Israeli football as a whole. The article uses primary sources from Nishri Archive in Wingate Institute and Israel State Archives. Secondary sources including print newspapers including *Al Hamishmar*, *Herut*, *Davar* and *Ma'ariv* from relevant periods.

The 1950s: corruption 'in the family'

As early as the 1950s, match-fixing occurred between teams belonging to the same political association, i.e., 'in the family'. This phenomenon was particularly prevalent when one of the teams faced relegation. The results were set in advance, in collaboration with the players, officials and even sport centre leaders. The alleged justification for this practice was related to the value of 'mutual solidarity', which occupied a central place in the worldview of the nascent Israeli society yet assumed a twisted and distorted expression in Israeli sports.

Match-fixing first made headlines in the 1951–52 football season. *Maccabi Tel Aviv* led the standings by a significant margin. *Maccabi Netanya*, on the other hand, was struggling at the bottom of the table, and its rival in the struggle against relegation to a lower league was *Hapoel Rishon Lezion*. In the final round of the league, the leading team from Tel Aviv was slotted to play against Netanya from the bottom of the league table. No one doubted the victory of *Maccabi Tel Aviv*, which had already secured first place in the league by substantial margin of goals. The encounter between the teams did not bode well for *Maccabi Netanya*, but sports officials soon devised a way out of this 'complication'.

The players of *Maccabi Tel Aviv* arrived in Netanya by bus, which stopped at the outskirts of the city for half-an-hour wait before making its way to the stadium, only to find that the referee had already declared a technical victory (3:0) to Netanya after waiting for 20 minutes as specified in the official rules of the game. The players of *Maccabi Tel Aviv* entered the stadium, which was packed to capacity, and explained that they were late because of a flat tire in the bus that took the team to the game. After ensuring that *Maccabi Netanya* was awarded two technical league points, the teams held a friendly match, which ended 9:0 to *Maccabi Tel Aviv*. *Maccabi Netanya's* place in the league was preserved and *Hapoel Rishon Lezion* was relegated to a lower league. A reporter of the left-wing *Davar* newspaper condemned the incident: 'This act is not appropriate for any team and has damaged the reputation of the league's champion'.¹²

A similar incident occurred in *Maccabi Rehovot's* game against *Maccabi Haifa*. The game was described in the left-wing *Al Hamishmar* newspaper as a 'theatre show'. *Maccabi Rehovot*, which hosted *Maccabi Haifa*, appeared with a line-up of young players and was defeated by the guests 1:6. Seven hundred spectators watched with amazement as two *Maccabi Rehovot* players deliberately scored own goals. A central forward of the latter team, Jamil, surpassed himself – he 'went the wrong way by mistake' and attacked his own team's goal. Hundreds of spectators who watched the farce unfolding before their eyes walked out in protest.¹³ The right-wing *Herut* paper demanded to establish a commission of inquiry on the subject of football corruption. The guilty ones, according to the reporter, were the sport officials. 'The collusions made in this association ... will cost Israeli football dearly ... the incompetent officials have brought the sports to a state of total destruction'.¹⁴

In the 1953–54 sport season, *Maccabi Haifa* was once again at risk of relegation to the second league. This time, the team gained points from stronger *Maccabi* teams, such as *Maccabi Tel Aviv*. Its game against *Maccabi Tel Aviv* ended in a draw 0:0. A huge scandal erupted when *Maccabi Haifa* expectedly defeated *Maccabi Petah Tikva* 3:1. It turned out that team officials had travelled to Petah Tikva before the game and, in the name of 'Maccabi solidarity', decided the outcome of the game with the local managers. *Maccabi Petah Tikva* lost the game deliberately and thus saved *Maccabi Haifa* from relegation at the expense of *Beitar Jerusalem*. The game was so outrageous that even Petah Tikva players could not bear it and walked off the field as the game continued. Thousands of spectators joined the players and left the stadium in protest.¹⁵

Another cause of malfeasance occurred in the second league. In 1954, two teams fought for the right to move up to the first league: *Beitar Jerusalem* and *Hapoel Rehovot*. When the playing season ended, both teams had an equal number of points, but *Beitar* had better a goal ratio. *Beitar* continued to look

for a way to disqualify *Hapoel Rehovot* games. They were pleased to discover that the name of the forward Tzvi Schmidt appeared on Ra'anana's list of players in the game that their team lost to *Hapoel Ra'anana* 1:2, though Schmidt was abroad at the time of the game. It turned out that a player from Haifa participated in the game instead of him. When the deception was brought before the court of the Football Association the court decided to grant *Beitar* a technical victory 3:0 and two league points. *Hapoel Rehovot* initiated a counterattack: its officials discovered that in the game in question the referee dismissed *Beitar* player Shalom Tzion from the field. The Constitution of the Association prohibited a player who was dismissed from the game to play before standing a disciplinary hearing. Tzion, however, used his brother Avraham's card to register for the next game against *Maccabi Ramat Gan*. Unfortunately for him, he was dismissed again. One week later he was back in the game against *Hapoel Herzliya*. In response, the referees of these games were summoned by the Disciplinary Committee to testify against *Hapoel Ra'anana* and *Maccabi Ramat Gan*.

At the beginning of the meeting, a *Beitar* official announced that Avraham Tzion (brother of the dismissed player) was ill and stated that he had medical certificates attesting to his illness. The committee therefore summoned Shalom Tzion, the dismissed player for identification, but the referees indicated that he was not the player whom they dismissed from the games. After a short investigation it turned out that the person who showed up for the identification was not Shalom Tzion but his allegedly ill brother Avraham. The verdict was decisive: a six-month suspension for Shalom Tzion and a deduction of four league points for the team. *Beitar* appealed to the Supreme Court of the Football Association, which ruled that the player's identification was insufficient and a new identification procedure was required. The court summoned all 11 *Beitar* players for additional line-up. When they arrived, the referee of the game against *Ra'anana* glanced at them and was speechless. Everyone had grown beards and moustaches. The confused referee was unable to identify the dismissed player. *Beitar* enjoyed the benefit of the doubt, the punishment was cancelled, and the team moved up to the higher league.¹⁶

In the 1955–56 playing season, there were many instances of match-fixing. The unlikely results of the league matches that season attested to that: 9:0, 12:0, 11:0, 7:0. Football Association President, Judge Yosef Lam, stated, 'Most of the games in the second round were not played in a sportive spirit'.¹⁷

The 1960s: games 'under the table'

In the 1960s and early 1970s, Israeli sports slowly started to shift from the political model to a commercial one based on professionalism.¹⁸ In those

years, two major developments affecting the status of officials in the political sport associations began to unfold:

- **The weakening of the connection between athletes and the sport associations.** Up to the 1960s, match-fixing officials did so for their associations and the political movements to which they belonged.
- **The shift towards professional sport.** In Israel's early years, the amateur ethos was dominant at least at the declarative level, allowing political officials to reward players by providing employment in various organisations thus ensuring their financial dependence.¹⁹

In the 1960s, the phenomenon of corruption acquired a new character: players received benefits and payments 'under the table' (illegal for amateurs), such as payments for arranging a Bar Mitzvah celebration for a player's son, coaching fees, travel expenses, outstanding performance awards, etc.²⁰ Creative methods were devised to justify cash payments. For example, footballers were paid as if they coached youth teams, but in fact they were paid to play. Other players received loans for the purchase of flats or cars and the associations covered their debts.²¹

In addition to such unofficial earnings, there were rumours about the involvement of players, coaches and officials in match-fixing, bribing opponents, and setting the results of football matches in advance to increase their gambling profits. The most famous case was the *Yeshayahu Alon Affair*. Alon, who played for *Maccabi Petah Tikva*, contacted the goalkeeper of *Maccabi Yafo*, Tzion Digmi, and asked him to concede a goal in exchange for 500 Israeli Lira. When the affair was exposed, he was banned from playing for five years.²²

These negative practices prompted the establishment of investigation commissions and the imposition of stricter penalties. One of the commissions investigating corruption in Israeli football in the 1960s was the Sarig Commission, led by the Chairman of the Football Association at the time Arie Sarig. Among other things, the commission discovered that association managements and football fans had colluded in match-fixing for a fee.²³ The commission recommended educational activities and stricter punishments.

In 1964, three adult football players, Danny Borsuk, Moshe Leon, and Ze'ev Seltzer, were charged with forging their age so as to allow them to participate in the Asian Youth Championship. This fact was known to certain officials at the sport association. The three players were arrested and interrogated, but vehemently denied being responsible for the forgery.²⁴ After their release, they were permitted to join the youth team going to Saigon, but the organising committee refused to allow them to play because of their older age.²⁵

Corruption in football was discussed by the Knesset's Education Committee. The minutes of the meeting reveal the scope of the phenomenon and the absence of efforts by the sport institutions to eradicate it. The head of the Sport Authority, Assael Ben-David, reported that only two of the ten teams suspected of inappropriate practices were punished. The investigation of most of the suspected teams was terminated and a cover-up was suspected. The minutes indicate that there was no public supervision over the Football Association and the management of its budget. Committee members made various proposals, including dismissal of the Football Association's management and placing the Association under the auspices of the State Sport Authority; direct supervision of the Authority over Association accounts; supervision of ticket sales; approval of the Sport Law, and allowing professionalism in sport.²⁶

One of the proposals designed to eradicate corruption in football was to 'freeze' national league games (the top league during the said period). The freeze was intended to reduce public interest in the league and prevent match-fixing. In 1965, a decision was taken to 'freeze' the league for two years, or, as the treasurer of the Football Association Tzvi Brim put it, to 'extend the league by two years'.²⁷ Another decision was made: league matches between teams from the same association would be held first and only after that would the games between these teams and the teams from the other associations be held.²⁸ This decision did not lead to serenity or peace in Israeli football. Efforts to fix matches, by either bribing the players or resorting to violence against them, did not stop. Fans and players did not stop threatening football referees or physically abusing them. For instance, in January 1966 *Hapoel Jerusalem* played against *Maccabi Yafo*. When a *Hapoel Jerusalem* player was fouled in the penalty area, the referee Menahem Ashkenazi awarded a penalty kick from 11 metres against *Maccabi Yafo*. Yafo players rushed to the referee in an attempt to change his mind. When persuasion failed, the Yafo player Aharon Levy emerged from behind and kicked the referee in the leg in what one paper described as 'a wonderfully strong kick'. Ashkenazi immediately ended the game and refused to renew it despite the pressure exerted on him.²⁹

Many politicians remained indifferent to the corruption and violence.³⁰ The only one who warned and fought against sport corruption was a member of Knesset from the *HaOlam HaZeh - Koah Hadash* faction, Uri Avnery, who proposed (in January 1966) several solutions to the problem of match-fixing: closing the Football Association, dissolution of its political board and its transfer to state regulation, direct supervision of the Authority over the finances of the sport institutions, supervision over game ticket sales and an amendment to the Criminal Code to include sport corruption in state law.³¹

In December 1966, Avnery again proposed that a debate be held in the Knesset Presidium regarding the sport problems in Israel. He argued that the

stench of corruption was rising from football and that the officials ruled it as they pleased. The source of corruption, he argued, was the fact that football had become a 'business', yet there was no supervision over the huge revenues from the numerous games. One of Avnery's conclusions was that a special Ministry for Sport Affairs should be established. Deputy Minister of Education Aharon Yadlin objected, claiming that teaching physical education, of which he was in charge, and sports in general, contributed to a sense of equilibrium in people's lives. He admitted, though, that there was a risk of individual gamblers exerting pressure on players 'to sell games' in order to make profit. Eventually, Avnery's request to hold a general Knesset discussion on the issue was rejected and the matter was referred to the Education and Culture Committee.³²

After the 1967 Six Day War, corruption in sport increased further. One reason for this was a leap in living standards and an increase in revenues from gambling. Many football officials were given free tickets to national and international games, fancy suits and luxury items such as alcoholic beverages funded by the Association.³³ The reporter Yeshayahu Porat described the phenomenon: 'The leaders of football were able to enjoy in recent years many benefits of popular mass sport and established for themselves a solid status immune to hazards or shocks. No political official or public representative in any other sports (let alone in another country), would stand a chance against harsh public criticism'.³⁴ Criticism of officials focused mainly on their hedonistic lifestyle. The criticism hurt their image but did not challenge their public status as a group of individuals who work on a voluntary basis to promote sports in Israel. Indeed, up to the early 1970s, football officials became organised and gained greater political power than in any other sports. Political sport officials, who participated in all kinds of tax-evasion schemes, enjoyed privileges given to them by income tax officers who had an affinity to *Hapoel*. However, in the late 1960s, the authorities' attitudes towards sports officials underwent a transformation and tax officials were instructed to increase monitoring and collection in this sector.³⁵

The attempt to eradicate corruption – the Etzioni commission

Until 1971, there were no criminal laws or regulations in Israel prohibiting buying or selling games. Cases of suspected match-fixing were brought before the disciplinary tribunals of the Football Association. That year, there was a shift in public attitude towards sport officials. Rumours that football players and teams in the national league were paid to fix matches were spreading once again. The rumours became facts as three players from *Maccabi Ramat Amidar* were convicted in the Football Association Disciplinary Court of selling a game. During the court sessions, it turned out that the corruption reached far deeper than it had been previously

believed. To expose the problem more fully, the Football Association turned to private investigation agency 'Modiin Ezrahi'.

The findings of the investigation revealed, among other things, a deal to sell a game that was being negotiated between *Hapoel Hadera* footballer Yosef Hamami and *Bnei Yehuda* centre back Menachem Cohen. The case was discussed in various legal instances by eight judges representing the state, including four Supreme Court Judges: Moshe Etzioni, Moshe Landau, Yitzhak Kister and Yitzhak Cohen. Seven lawyers served in the courts and in the various committees and a battery of lawyers represented the parties in various sessions.³⁶ The affair led to a debate on the corruption in the Knesset Presidium. Knesset Members (MKs) voiced concerns regarding corruption in Israeli sport and assessed the situation as involving 'conspiracies, pressure, an atmosphere poisoned by suspicions, secret payments "under the table", silencing [by football officials] to the point of teaching an entire generation how to be corrupt'.³⁷ At the end of the debate, the government decided to recommend the establishment of a State Commission of Inquiry. Minister of Education Yigal Allon and his two deputies, Aharon Yadlin and Michael Hazani, decided to establish a commission under the Commissions of Enquiry Law that would investigate the rumours concerning the payments players received for setting the results of the football matches in advance. The three submitted their decision to Supreme Chief Justice Shimon Agranat and he appointed Judge Moshe Etzioni to head the commission.³⁸

The Etzioni commission held 18 meetings and heard testimonies of 39 witnesses. Some of the officials who were summoned to testify tried to evade giving evidence, and upon arriving claimed they knew nothing about the charges against them and their teams. There were also witnesses who used the occasion to settle personal accounts with other officials and to smear their reputation.³⁹ Though the commission's letter of nomination limited the enquiry to one issue – National League games in the 1970–71 season – it soon transpired that the commission would not be able to fulfil its function properly unless it expanded the scope of the investigation beyond the letter of nomination to discuss the sport management culture in Israel as a whole. The Israeli public expressed great interest in the commission's activity, as is evident from the many letters it received and the articles that appeared in the national and international press covering its meetings.⁴⁰

In September 1971 the commission published its conclusions in a critical report that exposed the corrupt system of rewards prevalent among football teams, including players, sport officials, teams and the Football Association, which observed an 'agreed conspiracy of silence'. The system of payments 'under the table' led to such phenomena as intimidation and extortion. Football teams benefited from large sums of money without supervision and public control, thus violating the state tax laws. Football players received many hidden benefits and illegal payments.⁴¹ The harshest criticism was

directed at sport officials, pointing to the lawlessness in the area of financial management of sports institutions and a clear conflict of interests on the part of office holders.

One of the major issues discussed by the commission was sports betting.⁴² The attempts to predetermine the results of the games in order to profit from *Toto* betting were among the main factors that influenced the loss of public confidence in Israeli football. Dating back to the 1950s, betting had become a thriving business sector by the early 1970s. *Toto* revenues surged from 11 million Israeli Lira in 1967 to 40 million in 1971. Along with *Toto*'s contribution to the construction of sports facilities and the purchase of sports equipment and accessories, severe adverse effects appeared as well. Organised crime considered betting a convenient arena for profit making and money laundering. Therefore, methods of buying games were based on bribing key players or exerting pressure on the players to play according to gamblers' instructions.⁴³

The Etzioni Commission also criticised officials who concurrently held the key positions in the *Betting Council* and *Gesher* (the company that had a concession to operate the *Toto* stations) and public positions in sport institutions that were financially dependent on allocation of funds from *Toto* Council. As an example, the commission mentioned Jerry Beit Halevi, a *Gesher* executive and owner of a *SporToto* betting station, who concurrently served as a member of the Football Association and chairman of the *Maccabi Tel Aviv* football team. Beit Halevi was the one who decided which teams would be placed on *Toto* participation forms. The Commission also mentioned Yosef Inbar, who served as chairman of *Betting Council* and at the same time as chairman of the Olympic Committee and secretary of the *Hapoel* Association – organisations that received their budget from the *Betting Council*. Another member of the Council, Tzvi Brim, served as vice Chairman of the Football Association. Moreover, the Commission stated that:

Neither any of the associations nor the Football Association were asked by the Betting Council to provide a report on using these funds. No audit was performed. There was no supervision on behalf of the Council whether the funds paid to these organizations were indeed efficiently and correctly used for promoting the sport.⁴⁴

Toto's allocation of funds for the 1970–71 season were as follows: to the Football Association 2,120,300 Israeli Lira, to *Hapoel* Association 1,434,400 Israeli Lira, to *Maccabi* Association 835,600 Israeli Lira and to *Beitar* Association 367,900 Israeli Lira. All these amounts were transferred without any audit or supervision.⁴⁵ While the work of the Etzioni Commission was still going on, *Ma'ariv* published an article pointing to *Toto* as the main source of corruption in Israeli sport. The paper described the conflict of interests of *Toto* office holders as follows:

There are complex combinations of the *Toto* operators and sport officials, who are members of the Public Council and the sports organizations themselves in joint membership and partnership with *Gesher*, they are the *SporToto* station owners and also players whose playing should decide the outcome of the games, they are the *Toto* station owners themselves and they bet large amounts of money on their own games . . . The *Toto* which should have been the source of income for development of sport in general and football in particular, turned into the source of corruption and selling games.⁴⁶

Further into the article, the paper accused the government of allowing ‘*SporToto* to “abandon” Israeli sport [leaving it] in the hands of gambling gangs, players and officials’.⁴⁷ The most senior official, Yosef Inbar, who was both the head of the institution that provided the funds and head of the recipient of these funds, suffered the harshest criticism in the commission’s report. His hesitant appearance and stammering testimony before the commission further undermined the credibility of football officials. As Inbar described the ‘mechanism’ of fund transfers from *Toto* to sport institutions in his testimony:

Question: Now tell me, you distribute the money, do you get a report from all these institutions regarding their disposition of the money?

Answer: We do not get reports.

Question: How is it possible that the institution that gives the money conducts no supervision?

Answer: There is no need. The associations are audited and run fairly well, they know how to do it.

Question: How is it possible that you come here and say that you think there is no need for audit? How do you explain that? I’d like to know why do you think that there is no need, you as the council chairman.

Answer: Because these associations have their own audit mechanism. We are familiar with their operation and we have confidence.⁴⁸

Judge Etzioni did not hide his displeasure at Inbar’s testimony. He told the participants in the hearing about a Japanese defence minister who took responsibility and resigned when learning of a collision between civil and military aircrafts in Japan’s airspace. Inbar didn’t respond to Etzioni’s obvious hints. Later in the meeting, Inbar purported hold a minor position at the *Hapoel* Association in order to evade responsibility. Commission member Yitzhak Ziv-Av was quick to reprimand the person who served as

Secretary-General of *Hapoel* and as a Chairman of the *Betting Council* and the Chairman of the Olympic Committee: 'You're a very central figure in sport, don't belittle yourself'.⁴⁹

The commission also criticised the officials' morality, including the receipt of free air tickets. The common argument among officials was that they were entitled to these tickets because they volunteered to work day and night for the benefit of the sport.⁵⁰ The commission determined that sport officials were indifferent to violations of fairness in sport and turned their backs on 'educating the public in the values and the spirit of sportsmanship', recommending to abolish the connection between the *Betting Council* and the sport associations.⁵¹ As it stated:

In general, our impression with the appearance of the top officials before us, especially those who have served in their positions for many years, is that their public senses are dull and their sensitivity to the purity of the sport is flawed.

The commission also recommended limiting the officials' terms in key positions as 'this has caused disconnection of the representatives from those whom they represent and made their activity into professional officials' activity with all attendant negative consequences'. In the report's concluding words: 'In light of the findings that we have detailed in the chapters dealing with failures, the Football Association, the sport Associations and also senior officials should not be released from the responsibility for the situation that has arisen.'⁵²

In the wake of the report

Impressed by the commission's harsh conclusions, the public demanded far-reaching changes in football institutions, including personnel changes of top office holders. Aaron Lahav, *Davar's* sport editor, called to change football's structure in Israel and the arrangements for *Toto* fund transfers. He claimed that there was public flaw in having a small number of officials in important positions.⁵³ Journalist Dan Patir called on the minister of education to purge the Football Association by freeing it from the clasp of political functionaries and administrators.⁵⁴ Minister of Education Allon demanded the resignation of all those involved and mentioned in the Etzioni Commission report, appointing Yadlin as chairman of the Football Association instead of Yitzhak Zeevi. He also instructed the presence of a permanent representative of the Sport Authority at board meetings of the Football Association.⁵⁵ A year later, he appointed Col. (res.) Zeev Bar-Sever as chairman.⁵⁶ This appointment was a temporary solution to the institution that lost its credibility and prestige after the dismissal of its leaders. The appointment of a retired military officer to a civilian position was a common solution to previous crises in Israeli sports.⁵⁷ It reflected external political interference

that was imposed on the sport institutions and reduced the hegemony of *Hapoel* and *Maccabi* officials.

The report's release ruined the image of sport officials and embarrassed them. The embarrassment was stronger mainly among *Hapoel* officials who represented the dominant labour movements. These officials had to deal with unexplained contradiction between socialist ideas they represented and the corrupt image that clung to them, in addition to their extravagant lifestyle.

In September, Yehoshua Sagi of *Ha'aretz* newspaper published two articles in which he criticised Inbar's public conduct. Responding to Sagi's allegations concerning the car, phone and flat made available to him Inbar wrote: 'Does he indeed mean to imply that these accessories that are considered a luxury nowadays are inappropriate for a representative of the workers?' He added:

Mr. Sagi claims that on my arrival at Asian capitals I am provided with a fancy car and a number of guards to clear the way for it ... How can I refuse a reception customary in those countries when I visit them in my capacity as chairman of Israel's Olympic Committee?⁵⁸

By way of restoring the public image of their officials, the sport associations and the Football Association decided to hire the services of advertising and PR agencies. The efforts to improve the public image rather than fundamentally change the structure of sports in Israel led to a furious reaction on the part of the fans, who were angry about the waste of public funds at the expense of investment in sport, all for the sake of covering up flaws and corruption.⁵⁹

Another way of dealing with the report's severe conclusions was to fend off the accusations against officials and point to the corruption in sport as part of the ills of the entire society. *Hapoel* official and treasurer of the Sport Association Yaakov Vilan published an opinion article *Al Hamishmar* in which he defended the sport officials against the public criticism: 'We must not forget that the flaws of the sport are the flaws of Israeli society rather than an expression of sport leaders' inability to stand strong'. He went on to attack 'our best friends' – the politicians and party officials who joined the public criticism of the officials: 'Sport officials are being attacked also due to the lack of rotation. It is interesting that the attackers themselves fail to implement this good idea in any other system in our life'. According to Vilan, the press is to blame for the excessive attack of sport officials.⁶⁰

The Etzioni Commission's harsh conclusions made a strong impression on the public and kindled hopes for a real change in the management of sport in Israel. The Football Association leadership was forced to resign, the activities of sport officials were put under public scrutiny, state sports betting operations (*Toto*) reorganised its systems, and MK Yitzhak Hans Klinghoffer of the Liberal Party submitted a proposal to amend the law allowing criminal

prosecution in cases of match-fixing.⁶¹ Ostensibly, it was a decisive victory for public opinion, the ministry of education and the organisations supervising the conduct of voluntary institutions. In effect, corruption and violence were deeply rooted in Israeli sport and this issue did not receive a consistent and long-term treatment from sport officials, not even those who were appointed after the censorious report had been published. Five months after its publication, Moshe Ben-Zeev, a former Attorney General and a commission member, announced that based on the ongoing situation in football it seemed that there was no choice but to appoint an additional commission of inquiry. As he saw it, most of the commission's recommendations and conclusions had not been implemented:

I don't understand how it is possible that, four months after the state commission published its conclusions and stated flatly that the *Toto* in its current structure is the root of evil in Israeli football, the betting organization continues operating according to the previous criteria without restrictions. Therefore, there is no impediment to the continuation of the fraudulent acts . . . despite everything that occurred last summer in the Israeli football I do not notice any improvement . . . not only did the atmosphere in the fields not improve, but it even worsened.⁶²

Another commission member, Yitzhak Ziv-Av, expressed dissatisfaction with the situation: 'Sales continue, fans go on rampage in the fields, *Toto* does not change and the general atmosphere is still grim'.⁶³ The Knesset's education and culture committee recommended separating the *Betting Council* from the body that decides on the distribution of the funds. This recommendation was difficult for the political sport officials as it would eliminate the main source of their power. Moreover, the commission recommended that the *Betting Council* should comprise 12 members: six civil servants, four representatives of the sport associations, and two representatives of the public. The public representatives were supposed to be appointed by the government. Like the Etzioni Commission, the Knesset's education and culture committee failed to unravel the complex network of connections between the sport associations and major political parties.

The years attending the 1973 Yom Kippur War were marked by a crisis in Israeli society in many fields of life. Violent reactions against public institutions became acceptable and widespread. Many individuals owned firearms, a fact that intensified violence as guns were used as a solution to problems and conflicts.⁶⁴ These facts also contributed to increased vandalism at sport games in general and in football matches in particular. The disciplinary committee of the Sport Association had a backlog of claims and litigation cases involving serious incidents including mass rioting at the fields, beating players or threatening their relatives' lives, and harassment of coaches and referees.⁶⁵

The most shocking case of violence occurred in Rehovot in 1975. During a match between the local *Maccabi* team and *Maccabi Kfar Gabirol*, hundreds of fans of the visiting team rushed to the field and started beating the *Rehovot* players. During the riot, one of the *Maccabi Kfar Gabirol* fans stabbed footballer Mordechai Kind to death. Everyone condemned the act and urged the government and the Knesset to eradicate the violence. However, the violence did not stop; on the contrary, riots in the stadiums as well as stabbings of players became almost a matter of routine.

The same was true of match-fixing. Not only did this phenomenon not disappear but it became increasingly common. An investigation agency hired by the Sport Association explore a wave of rumours regarding the fixing of matches in the first and second leagues. In light of the violence and match-fixing, one would expect that legislation would renew public confidence in Israeli football, but Klinghoffer's private bill, which was intended to be included in the Penal Law, helped only slightly to restore the image of the country's most popular sport. The heads of the sport not only had difficulties leading the sport in Israel to safety, but also contributed to the moral and professional deterioration.

All efforts to change the system and allow coaches and heads of various sports, rather than politicians, reach leadership positions at the Sport Association were met with resistance on the pretext that 'the executive is a public body that deals with public affairs'.⁶⁶ A good example was a political appointment of the chairman of the he Israel Electric Corporation's trade union, Yoram Oberkovich, as chairman of the Basketball Federation in 1985. Oberkovich's rival for the coveted position was Eliahu Amiel, a former national team player and chairman of the Basketball Federation. Professional considerations were not even included in the selection criteria for this position. Oberkovich's response to a reporter who criticised his political appointment illustrates the worldview of sports officials, who considered such appointments a necessity in the unchangeable reality:

You call this a political appointment, I don't. All chairmen who preceded me, or more precisely all of them were sport figures, not necessarily from basketball. All appointments were similar to mine. You are talking about my connections in the political system and the Trade Union – but this system did not help me when I was a candidate for the position of a Chairman of the Football Association. This is the method and you cannot escape it. Like the Knesset elections. We are dealing with a system that cannot be completely free and democratic. It must be restricted. I didn't come to change the system. Also when I failed in football I didn't blame the system ... sport by its nature is related to and consists of political powers ... everybody in sport institutions are messengers of political movements.⁶⁷

Conclusion

While the Etzioni Commission neither eradicated the corruption and violence in Israeli sport nor improved the conduct of the officials who instituted unorthodox practices, it raised for the first time the issue of officials' responsibility for corruption in Israeli sports, thus laying the groundwork for restructuring the country's sport institutions. Followed by ten state and other commissions of inquiry during the 1980s and the 1990s, the systematic failures of sport officials were fully exposed stirring levels of public criticism and leading to major changes in Israeli football, most notably the decline in the status of *Hapoel* Association due to its worsening in with its parent organisation – the Histadrut Trade Union, the creation of the Elite Football Department in 1984 under the supervision of an international expert, and the privatisation and professionalisation of Israeli football, severing it from the political sport associations and transforming it into a business operating under the economic and commercial laws.

All in all, the Israeli case study shows that while corruption in sports in general and in football in particular has universal micro- and macro-level causes, in-depth analysis of the specific social and political contexts in which corruption develops, gains legitimacy, and becomes institutionalised is warranted. In Israel's early decades, as shown by this article, its politicised structure of sport activities played a significant role in undermining fair play and the integrity of football matches; and while the privatisation and commercialisation of Israeli football since the 1980s and 1990s ensured a management untainted by political considerations, it failed to uproot corruption in the field altogether. The causes and manifestations of football corruption in the capitalist era warrant further exploration by future studies.

Notes

1. Lidor, "Sport, Education and Sport Education."
2. Gefen (ed.), *Oxford Student's Dictionary*, 581.
3. Danon, "Official as Profession," 25.
4. Aquilina and Chetcuti, "Match-Fixing."
5. Numerator, "Corruption and Public Secrecy."
6. Preston and Szymanski, "Cheating in Contests."
7. Boeri and Severgnini, "Match Rigging"; Cashmore & Cleland, *Football's Dark Side*; Hill, "The Fix; A Critical Mass of Corruption"; Hughes and Coakley, "Positive Deviance."
8. Carpenter, "Match-Fixing, The Biggest Threat"; Hill, "A Critical Mass of Corruption."
9. Aquilina and Chetcuti, "Match-Fixing: The Case of Malta"; Cashmore and Cleland, "Football, ng: The Ca"; Edwards and Skinner, *Sport Empire*.
10. Hill, "A Critical Mass of Corruption."
11. Ben-Porat, *From Game to Commodity*.

12. Davar, "Maccabi Tel Aviv Wins," 3; Basok, "Violence, Scandals and ... Football," 37.
13. *Al Hamishmar*, "Collusion at the end of the league," 23 November 1952, 3.
14. Avraham, "Inquiry Commission," 3.
15. Basok, "Violence, Scandals and ... Football," 37; Avraham, "Haifa Scandal," 3.
16. Basok, "Violence, Scandals and ... Football," 37.
17. *Ibid.*
18. See note 11 above.
19. Hefer, "Football Turned Against its Creators," 14.
20. Ben-Porat, "Opium for the Masses," 148.
21. Porat, "A Business Named Football," 42.
22. Porat, "Collusion Commission," 8.
23. Davar, "Football – Without Corruption," 3.
24. Herut, "The Youth National Team," 5; Claus, "Corruption and Violence," 45.
25. Herut, *Today: Israel-Thailand*, 3.
26. Knesset Education Committee.
27. Tomer, "Freezing the Leagues," 27.
28. See note 11 above, 151.
29. Porat and Lerer, *Sport* 50.
30. Harif, *Muscular Zionism*, 360.
31. Knesset Education Committee debating the sport problems, File 517/91, Nishri Archives in Wingate Institute.
32. *Ma'ariv*, "Deputy Minister of Education," 8.
33. Porat, "Financial Independence," 8.
34. *Ibid.*
35. Etzioni Report, 45.
36. *Davar*, "The World Record in Saleball," 6.
37. Etzioni Report, 1–2.
38. The Establishment of the Commission of Enquiry according to Commissions of Enquiry Law 5729–1968, into the Rumours Concerning the Payment of Money in order to Influence the Results of the National League Football Games, Israel State Archives, c-9/6439.???
39. Lahav, "Corruption in Football," 14.
40. Merchant, *The Toto and the Israelis*, 14.
41. Claus, "Corruption and Violence," 38–39.
42. Levy and Galily, *Just for Sport*.
43. See note 41 above, 46.
44. Etzioni Commission Report, 17.
45. *Ibid.*, 40.
46. *Ma'ariv*, "The Main Source of Corruption."
47. *Ibid.*
48. Etzioni Commission Report, 43.
49. Golan, "Etzioni (to Inbar)," 12.
50. Golan, "Heads of Maccabi and Beitar," 12.
51. Etzioni Commission Report, 47–8; Lahav, "Commission's Recommendations," 12.
52. Etzioni Commission Report, 63.
53. Brosh, "A Public Management," 12.
54. Patir, Alon, "What about the Sport Association?" 13.
55. *Davar*, "Football Association Decided," s 16.

56. Kfir, "Please Meet Bar Sever," 14.
57. Carmi, "Sport in Uniform," 10–16.
58. Yosef Inbar to 'Haaretz' Editor, 6 October 1971, Israel State Archives, c-9/6439.
59. Beer, "Defending Officials," 12.
60. Vilan, "Failures of the Sport."
61. Proposal for a Law to amend the Penal Law (Bribery Offences), 5731–1971.
62. Lior, *Five Months after the Conclusions*, 5.
63. Ibid.
64. Shemesh and Drori, *National Trauma*.
65. Claus, *Corruption and Violence*, 40.
66. *Ma'ariv*, "We Have to Aim Our Activity," 12; Ibid., "Fuchs Will Remain," 8.
67. Rozenblum, *The New Chairman Oberkovich*, 24.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributors

Udi Carmi is a Senior Lecturer at the Physical Education School, Ohalo College, Israel.

Moshe Levy is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Ariel University, Israel.

Bibliography

- Aquilina, D., and A. Chetcuti. "Match-Fixing: The Case of Malta." *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics* 6 (2013): 107–128. doi:10.1080/19406940.2013.777938.
- Avraham, H. 1952. "Inquiry Commission – On the Contrary." *Herut*, December 21. [in Hebrew]
- Avraham, H. 1954. "The Haifa Scandal Should Not Be Hushed." *Herut*, September. [in Hebrew]
- Bar-Eli, M., and U. Zimri. "State Policy in the Area of Sport in Israel." In *The Physical Culture and Sport in Israel in the Twentieth Century*, edited by H. Kaufman and H. Harif, 341–346. Jerusalem and Netanya: Yad Ben Zvi, 2002.
- Basok, M. 1975. "Violence, Scandals and . . . Football." *Davar*, May 2. [in Hebrew]
- Beer, Y. 1971. "Defending Officials At Any Price?" *Davar*, August 29. [in Hebrew]
- Ben Porat, A. *From Game to Commodity, Israeli Football 1948-1999*. Beer-Sheva: Ben Gurion University Press, 2002.
- Ben-Porat, A. "Opium for the Masses: Football and Nationality upon the Establishment of the State of Israel." In *Sport, Values and Politics*, edited by I. Gur-Ze'ev and R. Lidor, 131–160. Holon: David Rachgold, 2007.
- Ben-Porat, A. "The Usual Suspect: A History of Football Violence in the State of Israel." *Sport in History* 36, no. 1 (2016): 98–116. doi:10.1080/17460263.2015.1016549.

- Boeri, T., and B. Severgnini. "Match Rigging and the Career Concerns of Referees." *Labour Economics* 18, no. 3 (2011): 349–359. doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2010.10.006.
- Brosh, Y. 1971. "A Public Management and A General Manager Should Be Appointed for Football Association and the Toto Structure Should Be Changed." *Davar*, August 18.
- Carmi, U. "Sport in Uniform." *Jewish Sports Heritage* 1, no. 2 (2015): 10–16.
- Carpenter, K. "Match-Fixing – The Biggest Threat to Sport in the 21st Century?" *Sweet and Maxwell's International Sports Law Review* 2 (2012): 13–24.
- Cashmore, E., and J. Cleland. *Football's Dark Side: Corruption, Homophobia, Violence and Racism in the Beautiful Game*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
- Claus, A. "Corruption and Violence in Sport and Israeli Reality." *Delinquency and Social Deviation C* 2 (1975): 35–48.
- "Collusion at the End of the League." *Al Hamishmar*, November 23, 2012. [in Hebrew]
- "The Commission of Inquiry into the Rumours Concerning the Payment of Money in order to Influence the Results of the National League Football Games." Report, Jerusalem, September 1971 (Etzioni Commission Report). [in Hebrew]
- Danon, E. 1987. "Official as Profession." *Maariv*, August 14. [in Hebrew]
- "Deputy Minister of Education: We Will Search for a Way to Promote Football, Which Is an Attraction for the Masses." *Maariv*, December 16. [in Hebrew]
- Edwards, A., and J. Skinner. *Sport Empire*. Oxford, England: Meyer & Meyer Sport, 2006.
- "Football – Without Corruption." *Davar*, May 31, 1963. [in Hebrew]
- "Football Association Decided upon Extensive Measures in Every Area of Football Sports before the Opening of the League." *Davar*, September 17, 1971. [in Hebrew]
- "Fuchs Will Remain the Chairman of the Sport Association Management." *Maariv*, February 4, 1974. [in Hebrew]
- Gefen, R., ed. *Oxford Student's Dictionary*. 3rd ed. Tel Aviv: Kernerman and Lonnie Kahn, 2003.
- Golan, S. 1971. "Heads of Maccabi and Beitar Supplied Only Technical Clarifications regarding Their Centers." *Davar*, July 22. [in Hebrew]
- Golan, S. 1971. "Etzioni (To Inbar): Don't You Think that People Should Draw Their Own Conclusions Sometimes?" *Davar*, August 26. [in Hebrew]
- Harif, H. *Muscular Zionism*. Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 2011.
- Hefer, A. 1971. "The Football Turned against Its Creators." *Davar*, June 27. [in Hebrew]
- Hill, D. *The Fix: Football and Organized Crime*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2008.
- Hill, D. "A Critical Mass of Corruption: Why Some Football Leagues Have More Match-Fixing than Others." *International Journal of Sports Marketing and Sponsorship* 11, no. 3 (2010): 38–52. doi:10.1108/IJSMS-11-03-2010-B005.
- Hughes, R., and J. Coakley. "Positive Deviance among Athletes: The Implications of Overconformity to the Sport Ethic." *Sociology of Sport Journal* 8 (1991): 307–325. doi:10.1123/ssj.8.4.307.
- Kfir, S. 1971. "Please Meet: Bar Sever the New Chairman." *Davar*, October 24. [in Hebrew]
- Knesset Education Committee. *File 517/31*. Jerusalem: Nishri Archives in Wingate Institute, June 16, 1966. [in Hebrew].
- Lahav, A. 1971. "1971 Corruption in Football." *Davar*, August 13. [in Hebrew]

- Lahav, A. 1971. "Commission's Recommendations." *Davar*, September 23. [in Hebrew]
- Levy, M., and Y. Galily. "Just for Sport!? Sports, Gambling and Politics in Israel." *International Journal of the History of Sport* 36, no. 1 (2009): 84–100. doi:10.1080/09523360802500113.
- Lidor, R. "Sport, Education and Sport Education." In *Sport, Values and Politics*, edited by I. Gur-Ze'ev and R. Lidor, 189–206. Holon: David Rachgold, 2007.
- Lior, G. 1972. "Five Months after the Conclusions – Nothing Has Been Done to Change the Situation." *Maariv*, January 31. [in Hebrew]
- "Maccabi Tel Aviv Wins the Championship, but 'Loses' in Netanya." *Davar*. November 23, 1952.
- "The Main Source of Corruption." *Maariv* newspaper clipping, Israel State Archives, file c-9/6439. [in Hebrew]
- Merchant, L. 1971. "The Toto and the Israelis through the Eyes of an American." *Davar*, August 8. [in Hebrew]
- Numerato, D. "Corruption and Public Secrecy: An Ethnography of Football Match-Fixing." *Current Sociology* 64, no. 5 (2016): 699–717. doi:10.1177/0011392115599815.
- Patir, D. 1971. "Alon, What about the Sport Association?" *Davar*, October 31. [in Hebrew]
- Porat, Y. 1963. "Collusion Commission Keeps Gathering Evidence." *Maariv*, April 21. [in Hebrew]
- Porat, Y. 1964. "Financial Independence Strengthens the Status." *Maariv*, July 23. [in Hebrew]
- Porat, Y. 1965. "A Business Named Football." *Maariv*, July 30.
- Porat, Y., and M. Lerer. *Sport 50, January-April 1966*. Bnei Brak: Gali Alpha Media, 1998.
- Preston, I., and S. Szymanski. "Cheating in Contests." *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 19, no. 4 (2003): 612–624. doi:10.1093/oxrep/19.4.612.
- "Proposal for a Law of Amendment of Penal Law (Bribery Offences), 5731 – 1971, Addition of a Clause 3a." http://www.nevo.co.il/law_word/law17/prop-0954.pdf. [in Hebrew]
- Rozenblum, M. 1986. "The New Chairman Oberkovich: Everybody Cheat Everybody in the Basketball Payment System." *Maariv*, September 11. [in Hebrew]
- Shemesh, M., and Z. Drori. *National Trauma – The Yom Kippur War: A Retrospective of Thirty Years and Another War*. Be'er Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 2008.
- "Today: Israel-Thailand in Asian Youth Championship Games." *Herut*, April 19, 1964. [in Hebrew]
- Tomer. 1986. "Freezing the Leagues, the Ball that Was Kicked into White Wilderness." *Davar*, November 18. [in Hebrew]
- Vilan, Y. 1971. "Failures of the Sport are Failures of the Israeli Society." *Al Hamishmar*, newspaper clipping, Israel State Archives, c-9/6429. [in Hebrew]
- "We Have to Aim Our Activity Towards the 80s." *Maariv*, February 27, 1974. [in Hebrew]
- Werner, S. "The Development of Political Corruption: A Case Study of Israel." *Political Studies* 31 (2006): 620–639. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1983.tb01357.x.
- "The World Record in Saleball." *Davar*, October 21, 1971. [in Hebrew]
- "The Youth National Team Took off to Saigon." *Herut*, April 14, 1964.